wasm-demo/demo/ermis-f/imap-protocol/cur/1600095019.22641.mbox:2,S

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MBOX-Line: From jkt at flaska.net Tue Mar 18 13:46:29 2014
To: imap-protocol@u.washington.edu
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Jan_Kundr=E1t?= <jkt@flaska.net>
Date: Fri Jun 8 12:34:52 2018
Subject: [Imap-protocol] STARTTLS after PREAUTH
In-Reply-To: <20140318141305.Horde.iyy0UP8Ostx9TojRZiFyjw1@bigworm.curecanti.org>
References: <20140318141305.Horde.iyy0UP8Ostx9TojRZiFyjw1@bigworm.curecanti.org>
Message-ID: <059bac1f-35eb-4f87-bd5e-e986dfb46b83@flaska.net>
On Tuesday, 18 March 2014 21:13:05 CEST, Michael M Slusarz wrote:
> Am I correct in my reading that this means that you lose any
> ability to protect message data via TLS if PREAUTH is used? In
> other words: was STARTTLS solely designed to protect
> authentication credentials (security) and not message data
> (privacy)?
Not at all. Once issued, STARTTLS protects everything, i.e. both your
credentials and transfers of all messages.
> I guess the workaround for a situation where you *could*
> preauthenticate based on connection factors/details, but still
> need message privacy, is to require some sort of dummy
> authentication (after initializing TLS layer). Feels pretty
> hackish though.
That's what you could get with AUTH EXTERNAL. Also, nothing prevents a
server from going directly to PREAUTH if the whole connection is using
SSL/TLS ("port 993") with client certificates.
I'm a bit confused by your message. How do you want to authenticate your
user? Specifically, what's the use case where you can safely verify the
user's identity, but cannot guarantee confidentiality of the connection
stream?
Cheers,
Jan
--
Trojit?, a fast Qt IMAP e-mail client -- http://trojita.flaska.net/